Wang Shao

Biography

Family Background and Early Years

Wang Shao was born in 1030, the eighth year of the Tiansheng era under Emperor Renzong of Song, in De'an, Jiang Prefecture. His great-grandfather Wang Shicheng and grandfather Wang Lingji were both posthumously granted the rank of Grand Master for Splendid Happiness with Gold Seal and Purple Ribbon because of Wang Shao's later eminence. His father Wang Shigui received successive posthumous promotions up to Grand Preceptor. His mother, Lady Chen, was titled Commandery Lady of Jiatai. The family was not a prominent official house; it was Wang Shao's generation that first rose through the examination system.

Wang passed the jinshi examination in 1057 at the age of twenty-eight. He first served as registrar of Xin'an and later as judicial assistant in Jianchang Military Prefecture. He became known for administrative ability, but his early career was not smooth. In 1061 he failed a special decree examination. The setback redirected his life: he left office, traveled in Shaanxi, investigated frontier customs and conditions, and studied the terrain, tribal distribution, and strengths and weaknesses of Western Xia. This experience provided the foundation for his later Pingrong Ce and his management of the Xihe frontier.

The Pingrong Ce and Entry into Frontier Affairs

In 1068 Wang came to Bianjing and presented the recently enthroned Emperor Shenzong with three essays titled Pingrong Ce. His central argument was that if the court wished to deal with Western Xia, it should first recover the He and Huang regions so that Xia would face pressure from front and rear. He argued that the descendants of the Gusiluo regime were weak, that the Qiang groups were divided and lacked unified leadership, and that the moment was therefore favorable for pacification and incorporation. If the Qiang groups submitted and the Gusiluo house came over, he claimed, the Li house of Hexi—Western Xia—could be brought under control. The proposal matched the reforming ambitions of Emperor Shenzong and Wang Anshi's faction and was immediately accepted. Wang was appointed planning secretary in the Qin-Feng Circuit military administration, giving a civil official responsibility for military affairs.

In 1070 Wang proposed establishing a Market Exchange Office between Weiyuan and Qin Prefecture and using merchant profits to develop wasteland. This caused a dispute with circuit commissioner Li Shizhong, who accused Wang of encroaching on land held by archers. Wang Anshi supported Wang Shao and removed Li. Later, Li Ruoyu investigated and found that Wang's claim of ten thousand qing of fertile land was inaccurate. Wang Anshi then removed Dou Shunqing and replaced him with Han Zhen, who supported Wang's position. Li Shizhong and Dou Shunqing were both demoted, while Wang Shao became Attendant to the Heir Apparent and collator in the Palace Library. The general Guo Kui later impeached Wang for improperly borrowing Market Exchange funds; Wang Anshi judged the evidence insufficient and transferred Guo to administer Jingyuan. Although Wang enjoyed Wang Anshi's protection at court, these episodes created lasting tensions with frontier commanders and civil officials.

The Xihe Expansion

In 1071 Tibetan commanders including Mu'er and Jieshukeba gathered at Mobang Mountain and approached Didao. In the seventh month of 1072, Wang sent troops to construct Weiyuan Fort and Qishenping and defeated the Mengluojiao, Mo'ershuiba, and other groups. The Qiang occupied strong terrain. When the generals wanted to form battle lines on level ground, Wang rejected the proposal, led the army directly toward Mobang Mountain, confronted the Qiang, and ordered that anyone who spoke of retreat be executed. The Qiang attacked downhill and the Song troops briefly gave ground, but Wang personally donned armor, supervised the fighting, and counterattacked, inflicting a major defeat. When Xiazheng crossed the Tao River to reinforce them, Wang sent another commander to make a feint by Zhuniu Ridge while he led the main force in a surprise attack on Wusheng, defeating Xiayao's forces. He fortified Wusheng as Zhentao Army, soon drove off Xiazheng, and accepted the submission of 20,000 members of his groups. The court changed Zhentao Army into Xi Prefecture and organized Xi, He, Tao, Min, and Tongyuan into a circuit. Wang, holding the title of Awaiting Orders of the Longtu Pavilion, became prefect of Xi.

In the third month of 1073 Wang captured He Prefecture and was promoted to Direct Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Qiang groups that had already submitted rebelled again, and Wang turned back to suppress them while Xiazheng seized He Prefecture. Wang captured Henuomuzang City, crossed Lugu Mountain, and moved south into Tao Prefecture. The roads there were so narrow and difficult that Song troops abandoned their horses and marched on foot, sometimes fighting six or seven engagements in a single day. Xiazheng left a subordinate to hold He Prefecture and followed Wang's army, but Wang defeated him in hard fighting and He Prefecture was pacified again. Wang then successively took Dang and Min prefectures, while Qiang chiefs in Die and Tao surrendered their cities. The campaign lasted fifty-four days and covered 1,800 li. Five prefectures were gained, several thousand enemy heads were taken, and cattle, sheep, and horses were captured by the tens of thousands. Wang was promoted to Left Grand Remonstrant and Academician of the Duanming Hall.

Relief of He Prefecture and Promotion at Court

In 1074 Wang entered court and was given the title Academician of the Zizheng Hall and a residence in Chongren Ward. While traveling as far as Xingping, he learned that Jing Sili had been defeated at Tabai City and that Qiang forces were besieging He Prefecture. He rode day and night back to Xi Prefecture. The city was being fortified, but Wang ordered the defensive works stopped, selected 20,000 troops, and discussed a relief plan. The generals wanted to march straight to He Prefecture. Wang argued that the enemy had just won, had high morale, and enjoyed outside support, so a frontal battle would be disadvantageous; instead, he should strike what they relied on. He marched directly against Dingqiang City, defeated the Jiehe group, cut the route to Western Xia, advanced on Ninghe, and sent detachments into the southern mountains. Once Xiazheng learned that outside support had been severed, he lifted the siege. Returning toward Xi Prefecture, Wang moved around the western mountains and emerged behind Tabai City, burning 8,000 Qiang tents. Xiazheng, now in desperate circumstances, requested surrender and was sent under guard to Bianjing.

Before this victory, the Qiang had become powerful again after Jing Sili's defeat, and some at court had proposed abandoning Xihe. Emperor Shenzong was so troubled that he reportedly could not eat or sleep normally and repeatedly ordered Wang to act cautiously and not take the field. When news of the victory arrived, the emperor was delighted. In the tenth month of 1074, Wang was appointed Academician of the Guanwen Hall and Vice Minister of Rites. Previously, the titles Academician of the Zizheng Hall and Academician of the Guanwen Hall had not been given to men who had never served as chief councillors; Wang's appointment created a precedent. Emperor Shenzong also appointed Wang's brothers and two sons to office and, over time, granted him 8,000 bolts of silk. In the first month of 1075 Wang was summoned as Vice Commissioner of Military Affairs and additionally enfeoffed as Founding Marquis of Taiyuan Commandery.

Break with Wang Anshi and Later Years

Although Xihe was established as a separate circuit, its tax income was meager and military provisions depended on transport from other circuits. Transport assistant commissioner Ma Jian investigated minor misconduct by officials. Wang wanted him removed, but Wang Anshi protected Ma, creating a dispute between Wang Shao and Wang Anshi. Wang repeatedly asked to resign on the ground that his mother was elderly, while Emperor Shenzong had Wang Anshi urge him strongly to remain.

During 1075–1076, the Song–Đại Việt war of the Xining era broke out. Wang memorialized that establishing administrative units in Jueli and Guangyuan amounted to “coveting an empty name while forgetting a real calamity.” He complained that those governing at court had not accepted his advice but now blamed him in connection with Xihe. He said his original intention had been to reach Yiwu and Lugan without consuming court resources and that he had never wanted Xihe made into a circuit or He and Min into prefectures. By placing responsibility for repeated warfare, labor, and expense on the court, he displeased Emperor Shenzong. In the second month of 1077 Wang was removed as Vice Commissioner of Military Affairs and sent to govern Hong Prefecture as Vice Minister of Revenue and Academician of the Guanwen Hall. In the tenth month he lost his honorary office because the language of a memorial thanking the throne contained resentment and was sent to govern E Prefecture.

In the fifth month of 1079 he was again appointed to Hong Prefecture. In the sixth month of 1081 he died of illness at the age of fifty-two. He was posthumously awarded the rank of Grand Master for Splendid Happiness with Gold Seal and Purple Ribbon and the posthumous name Xiangmin. Six of his sons were appointed to office, three daughters received official headdresses and robes, and his eldest daughter was titled County Lady of Ruichang. In 1096 a temple was established for him in Xihe, and in 1104 it received the title “Zhonglie.”

Wang Shao, courtesy name Zichun, was a native of De'an in Jiangzhou, born on the twenty-eighth day of the second month of 1030. Passing the examinations early, he served as registrar of Xin'an and judicial officer of the Jianchang army; failing in the special examination, he traveled through Shaanxi gathering information on the frontier, and so came to know the situation in He-Huang and toward the Tangut Xia at first hand.

In 1068 Wang Shao presented three memorials on pacifying the frontier to Emperor Shenzong, setting out in detail a strategy for the conquest of Xia. His argument was that Xia could only be taken after the recovery of the He and Huang regions, which would threaten the Tangut rear; that if the Song failed to take them, the Xia would strike south into Qin and Wei, seize Lan and Hui, cut the road at Guwei and subdue the southern tribes, build a fortress at Wusheng and raid Tao and He continually, endangering all Long and Shu. He noted that the Tibetan tribes of the Tsongkha were then weak and disunited, none holding more than a hundred or two hundred li and none able to stand against the Xia, so that they might be divided and won over one by one; once they submitted, the Li of Hexi — the Xia — would be in the palm of the hand. He proposed that the court win over their chiefs and settle them about Wusheng to gather their kin and rule their tribes, isolating the Xia from one another — the best policy.

The plan was supported by Shenzong and Wang Anshi. Between 1071 and 1073 Wang Shao, as officer of the Qin-Feng military commission, conducted the winning over and the fighting, receiving the submission of the great Tibetan chief Yugonghe and others, taking Wusheng and making it Xizhou, then Hezhou, Taozhou and Minzhou, and establishing the Xihe circuit — the largest expansion of the Northern Song. The opening of Xihe put pressure on the Xia from the flank and opened the road into He-Huang, making it the representative military achievement of the New Policies era. He was afterward made vice commissioner of the privy council and took part in central decisions, being posted out once over disputes on frontier policy. He died in 1081 at fifty-two.

The military course of the Xihe expansion was roughly this: in 1072 Wang Shao advanced to the Weiyuan fort, defeated the Tibetan tribes of Mengluojiao and Mo'ershuiba in turn, attacked Wusheng, whose defenders fled across the river, and took the town, renaming the Wusheng army the Zhentao army and soon after making it Xizhou. The Song then pressed westward, taking Hezhou, Taozhou, Minzhou, Dangzhou and Weizhou, and set up the Xihe circuit on the newly opened land with the Tongyuan army as one of its seats. The Tsongkha chief Muzheng, who held Hezhou in resistance, was broken and submitted, and Song control of the He-Huang region was established.

The expansion mattered in two ways. Militarily it let the Song threaten the Xia from the flank, changing the passive defense along the Hengshan and Suide line; in transport and trade, opening the He-Huang road made communications between the central plains, the northwest and the western regions easier. During the New Policies the land and tribal population gained were used to support military expenditure and the horse administration. But the enterprise was extremely costly, with troops long stationed in newly attached territory and supply difficult; the court debated repeatedly whether to keep developing He-Huang, and this was bound up with Wang Shao's own advancement and setbacks.

The troops used in the Xihe expansion were mainly tribal auxiliaries and provincial soldiers, with grain and equipment hauled by the people of the Qin-Feng and Jing-Yuan circuits at great cost; in the recovered He-Huang lands the Song established prefectures and armies, gave office to tribal chiefs and gradually introduced military farming, an approach later summarized as using one people against another and rallying the tribes as allies. The creation of the Xihe circuit also changed the shape of Song defense: where the line had faced the Xia along the Hengshan and Suide sector, after Xihe was opened the Song could threaten the Xia right flank from Lanzhou and Hezhou, placing the Xia under pressure from two directions.

In his last years Wang Shao took part in central decisions as vice commissioner of the privy council, moving in and out of office as he differed with those managing frontier affairs. He died in 1081, at the time of the great Song offensive against the Xia; afterward the two sides contested Lanzhou and Xihe repeatedly, the region being lost and regained at the end of the Northern Song and finally incorporated again during Huizong's expansion. In the history of Song frontiers, the opening of Xihe was the only strategically significant expansion the Northern Song conducted successfully.

Wang Shao's early years traveling through Shaanxi gathering information on the frontier are the direct reason he could present the memorials on pacifying it. Since Emperor Zhenzong the Northern Song had been chiefly on the defensive toward the Xia; after the treaty of Chanyuan peace with the Liao held, but the northwest remained the main drain on troops and money, and when Shenzong came to the throne determined to revive the state, one important part of Wang Anshi's reforms was to open new revenue to support armament — the setting in which the Xihe expansion won backing. During the expansion the Song won over Tibetan chiefs with office and used their strength to keep order, creating the system of tribal officials and tribal troops, which together with other frontier measures formed the substance of Northern Song frontier administration in its middle and late years.

The gains and costs of the Xihe expansion were debated already in the Song: its supporters held that it changed the strategic balance with the Xia, its critics that the new territory cost heavily and was hard to hold. Northern Song management of He-Huang thereafter went through several reversals, and the creation and later changes of the Xihe circuit are a typical case for studying the relation between frontier administration and fiscal burden under the Song.

His memorials on pacifying the frontier and the practice of the Xihe expansion are regarded by later ages as one of the rare initiatives in Northern Song strategy toward the Xia.

The creation of the Xihe circuit had far-reaching effects on the later course of the Song-Xia wars.

Major Activities

The Pingrong Ce and the Frontier Strategy

In 1068 Wang submitted the three-part Pingrong Ce, systematically proposing a strategy of recovering the He-Huang region, pacifying Qiang groups, and isolating Western Xia. He analyzed the weakness of the descendants of the Gusiluo regime and the lack of unity among the Qiang and argued that this created an opportunity to deal with them separately. The proposal closely matched the reform policies of Wang Anshi's faction, became the theoretical program for the Xihe Expansion, and set the direction of Wang's career for the following decade.

Directing the Xihe Expansion

From 1072 to 1073, while serving as planning secretary in the Qin-Feng Circuit military administration, Wang directed the Xihe Expansion. He defeated the Mengluojiao, Mo'ershuiba, and other groups, fortified Wusheng as Zhentao Army and then Xi Prefecture, captured He Prefecture, took Dang and Min prefectures, and received the surrender of Qiang chiefs in Die and Tao with their cities. The army campaigned for fifty-four days, covered 1,800 li, gained five prefectures, took several thousand heads, and captured tens of thousands of cattle, sheep, and horses. The Xihe Expansion was one of the few successful cases of territorial expansion in the middle and later Northern Song and created strategic pressure around Western Xia.

Relieving He Prefecture and Accepting Xiazheng's Surrender

In 1074, after Jing Sili was defeated at Tabai City and Qiang forces besieged He Prefecture, Wang rushed back from Xingping. Rejecting a direct relief march, he attacked Dingqiang City, defeated the Jiehe group, and cut the route to Western Xia, forcing Xiazheng to lift the siege. Wang then moved around the western mountains behind Tabai City and burned 8,000 Qiang tents. Xiazheng was forced to surrender. The victory stabilized the Xihe Circuit and ended discussion at court about abandoning it.

Pacifying Yulongke

Around 1071, the tribal leader Yulongke was the strongest power in the Qingtang region, and both the Weiyuan Qiang and Western Xia sought his support. Other commanders wanted to attack him, but Wang rode with only a few horsemen directly to his camp, explained the likely consequences of success and failure, and spent the night there. The next day both the Qiang and Xia parties sent leaders east with Wang. Soon afterward Yulongke led 120,000 members of his following to submit to the court and became the man later known as Bao Shun. The episode brought the largest tribal force in the Xihe region under Song authority at very low cost.

Controversies in Later Life

In his later years Wang was criticized for matters including “taking a concubine as wife” and “accumulating property.” His biography in the History of Song says that he had some military strategy but was “ambitious beyond his talents” and in later life became extravagant. His relationship with Wang Anshi changed from cooperation to hostility, and he also quarreled with frontier commander Guo Kui, transport assistant commissioner Ma Jian, and others. He was repeatedly demoted and died in frustration.

Personal Relations

• Wang Shigui — father; posthumously promoted several times, ultimately to Grand Preceptor.
• Lady Chen — mother; titled Commandery Lady of Jiatai.
• Wang Zhen — elder brother; ceremonial officer in the Court of Imperial Sacrifices.
• Wang Xia — younger brother; assistant in the Court of Judicial Review.
• Lady Yang — wife; posthumously titled County Lady of Penglai.
• Wang Kuo, Wang Hou, Wang Cai, and seven other sons. Wang Hou eventually served as acting Military Commissioner of Wusheng Circuit, was posthumously awarded Military Commissioner of Ningyuan Circuit, and received the posthumous name Zhuangmin; Wang Cai eventually held the rank of Left Court Gentleman for Service.
• Wang Anshi — early patron; later a political opponent.
• Han Zhen — supported Wang and helped sustain his claim concerning wasteland.
• Li Shizhong — removed after opposing Wang's Market Exchange Office proposal.
• Dou Shunqing — removed after investigating and finding Wang's wasteland claim inaccurate.
• Guo Kui — impeached Wang for improper borrowing of Market Exchange funds and was transferred away.
• Ma Jian — transport assistant commissioner of Xihe Circuit; had a hostile relationship with Wang.
• Emperor Shenzong of Song — adopted the Pingrong Ce and entrusted Wang with frontier expansion; later disliked Wang's resentful statements.
• Xiazheng — leader associated with the Gusiluo regime and a principal opponent in the Xihe Expansion; later surrendered and was sent under guard to Bianjing.
• Dongzhan — second-generation ruler of the Gusiluo regime and a potential opponent during Wang's administration of Xihe.

Historical Assessment

Northern Song and Contemporary Assessments

• Emperor Shenzong of Song: “In Xihe, Wang Shao went in and out of mortal danger ten thousand times and recovered prefectures and military jurisdictions; his achievements cannot be concealed.” This assessment is recorded in the Long Draft of the Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance.
• Wang Anshi strongly supported Wang in the earlier period and described him as “having aspirations for his age”; later the two fell out over Ma Jian.
• Contemporaries jokingly called him the “Deputy Commissioner of the Three Extraordinary Things,” referring to his “extraordinary plans, extraordinary victories, and extraordinary rewards,” as recorded in Dongxuan Bilu, vol. 7.

Southern Song and Yuan Periods

• Wang Cheng in Dongdu Shilüe wrote that Wang Shao, though a scholar who spoke of warfare, ultimately carried out the Xihe Expansion and possessed ability beyond ordinary men, but that he won fame through extraordinary plans and in later years was likewise defeated by the extraordinary.
• The compilers of the History of Song wrote that Wang had strategic skill in war and often won through unexpected plans, but was ambitious beyond his talents, became extravagant in later years, took a concubine as wife, and was criticized by contemporaries.

Ming and Qing Periods

• Wang Fuzhi, in Song Lun, argued that although Wang's Xihe Expansion was called frontier expansion, it in fact wasted state power: the whole strength of China was used to contest several poor prefectures, and the gains did not compensate for the losses.
• Bi Yuan, in the Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance, wrote that Wang was a scholar entrusted with frontier expansion who nevertheless succeeded in taking several Xihe prefectures and whose ability could not be denied, while noting that he first rose with Wang Anshi's support and ultimately broke with him.

Modern Assessments

• Deng Guangming described Wang as one of the few mid-Northern Song military figures with strategic vision and regarded the Pingrong Ce as the most systematic contemporary analysis of the Western Xia problem.
• Qi Xia regarded the Xihe Expansion as one of the Northern Song's few successful external wars and affirmed Wang's military ability, while interpreting his later break with Wang Anshi as evidence of division within the reform faction.