Liu Zheng

Biography

Family Background and Early Years

Liu Zheng traced his ancestry to Fanchuan in Jingzhao (in present-day Chang'an County, Shaanxi) and later moved to Rangcheng in Dengzhou (present-day Dengzhou, Henan). Amid the turmoil of the late Jin period, he joined the Southern Song and served under the famous Southern Song commander Meng Gong. As a young man, Liu Zheng was bold and resourceful, skilled in martial arts, and gradually distinguished himself in fighting against Jin forces.

During Meng Gong's attack on Jin-held Xinyang, Liu Zheng served as a vanguard. At night he led twelve picked men across the moat and over the walls, taking the defending commander by surprise and capturing him. Meng Gong was greatly impressed. Recalling how the Five Dynasties general Li Cunxiao had taken Luoyang with eighteen riders, he observed that Liu Zheng had captured Xinyang with even fewer men and therefore called him “Sai Cunxiao.” This action established Liu Zheng's reputation in the army.

Before his death, Zhao Fang once told his son Zhao Kui: “Liu Zheng is overflowing with talent. If your generation cannot make use of him, you should kill him and not leave him to become a future danger.” Zhao Kui did not follow the advice. The judgment reflected Liu Zheng's abilities while also foreshadowing his later conflicts with Southern Song commanders.

Achievements in Sichuan

In 1254 (the second year of the Baoyou era), Liu Zheng entered Sichuan with Li Zengbo. He was selected as a commander, repeatedly distinguished himself in battle, and advanced rapidly, becoming known by the nickname “Tie Husun.” In April 1260 (the first year of the Jingding era), he was promoted to Prefect of Luzhou and concurrently Deputy Pacification Commissioner of Tongchuan Circuit, guarding an important sector of the Sichuan front.

However, as a northerner who advanced through military merit and rose above many southern commanders, Liu Zheng became the object of jealousy and was treated as a “northerner.” Amid widespread praise he also became proud and arrogant and showed little deference to his superiors, worsening his conflicts with them. His superior Lü Wende became suspicious of him: his proposals were rejected and his achievements went unreported. Lü Wende also arranged for Yu Xing, who was already at odds with Liu Zheng, to become the Sichuan military administrator in order to suppress him.

Forced Surrender to the Yuan

Lü Wende and Yu Xing joined forces in an attempt to accuse and persecute Liu Zheng. Alarmed by the news, Liu Zheng sent agents to Lin'an (present-day Hangzhou, Zhejiang) to appeal to the court. Because senior officials such as Jiang Wanzai, who had long valued him, had already resigned, there was no one to hear his complaint. After seeing the renowned commanders Xiang Shibi and Cao Shixiong driven to death by the powerful chancellor Jia Sidao, Liu Zheng “felt increasingly endangered and unable to preserve himself” and secretly contacted the Mongols.

In June 1261 (the second year of the Jingding era), with no way out, Liu Zheng surrendered to the Mongol army with the fifteen commanderies and 300,000 households of Luzhou, and Shenbi City fell for the first time. Before doing so, he gathered the civil and military officers to announce the surrender. An administrative officer strongly objected and was killed on the spot. Liu Zheng then sent for the popular and talented Xu Biaosun and ordered him to draft the proclamation of surrender. Xu Biaosun flatly refused, saying, “This wrist may be severed, but this brush cannot write it.” Xu Biaosun's entire family was killed.

When Emperor Lizong of Song heard that Liu Zheng had defected to the Yuan, he was furious and exclaimed, “The upheaval south of Luzhou must be dealt with urgently.” Yu Xing, the Sichuan military administrator, led an army to besiege Shenbi City. Liu Zheng lost the first engagement, held the strongpoint, and sent to Chengdu for aid. When Mongol reinforcements arrived, Liu Zheng attacked through a concealed passage and, coordinating from inside and outside, encircled the Song army and killed it almost entirely. Yu Xing broke out and fled toward Chongqing. Using Luzhou as a base, Mongol forces seized most of Sichuan. The Southern Song was left with “only a little over twenty prefectures; and those so-called twenty-odd prefectures were all devastated.”

Service at the Yuan Court

In 1262 (the third year of the Zhongtong era), Liu Zheng entered court to meet Kublai Khan. He was assigned to a Branch Secretariat for the Chengdu and Tongchuan circuits and continued to hold the post of commander-in-chief. His colleagues, jealous of his achievements, prepared accusations against him. Fearing persecution, Liu Zheng asked to take separate command of Tongchuan. In July he was reassigned as commander-in-chief of Tongchuan.

In May 1263 (the fourth year of Zhongtong), the Song commanders Gao Da and Wen He advanced on Chengdu. Liu Zheng was ordered to hurry to its relief. When the Song soldiers heard that “Sai Cunxiao” had arrived, they withdrew. Liu Zheng pursued them and defeated the Song army at the Jin River.

In June 1266 (the third year of Zhiyuan), Liu Zheng was promoted to Zhaowu General-in-Chief and Pacification Commissioner of Nanjing Circuit. In November 1267 (the fourth year of Zhiyuan), he entered court and argued that if the Yuan wished to destroy the Southern Song, it had to take Xiangyang first. Kublai Khan accepted the strategic proposal and said, “My decision is made!”

Battle of Xiangyang

In July 1268 (the fifth year of Zhiyuan), Liu Zheng was promoted to Zhenguo Senior General and commander-in-chief. In September, together with the commander-in-chief Aju, he supervised the armies besieging Xiangyang. He led 50,000 troops in attacks on commanderies along the river and captured 80,000 Song civilians.

In June 1269 (the sixth year of Zhiyuan), he captured the Song military commander Tang Yongjian. In 1270 (the seventh year of Zhiyuan), he built 5,000 ships and trained 70,000 naval troops. Liu Zheng advised Bayan: “Our elite infantry and swift cavalry break whoever stands before them; only in naval warfare are we inferior to the Song. If we take away their strength, build warships, and train a navy, then the undertaking will succeed.”

In May 1271 (the eighth year of Zhiyuan), the Song commander Fan Wenhu sent the military commanders Zhang Shun and Zhang Gui in wheeled ships to deliver clothing and armor to Xiangyang. Liu Zheng intercepted the Song flotilla and killed Zhang Shun. In September, he was promoted to Assistant Grand Councilor of the Henan Branch Secretariat.

In January 1272 (the ninth year of Zhiyuan), he was additionally appointed commander-in-chief of the Han armies of the various wings. When the Xiangyang defender Lü Wenhuan climbed the wall to observe the enemy, Liu Zheng rode forward to challenge him and was struck by a concealed crossbow bolt fired by Lü Wenhuan's men. In March, Liu Zheng broke the outer works of Fancheng, taking two thousand heads and capturing sixteen subordinate commanders. In September, he captured Zhang Gui, who had left the city seeking reinforcements, at Guimenguan. In November, an edict placed 40,000 households of naval forces under his command. Li Tingzhi, the Song military administrator of Jinghu, attempted to sow discord against Liu Zheng but failed.

In January 1273 (the tenth year of Zhiyuan), the Yuan army broke Fancheng and massacred the city. Isolated and without relief, Lü Wenhuan surrendered Xiangyang. The Battle of Xiangyang ended, and the Southern Song position had essentially become hopeless.

Final Years and Death

After the Battle of Xiangyang, Liu Zheng entered court and proposed that the navy press the advantage and seize control of the Yangtze line. He was reassigned to the Huai River West Branch Bureau of Military Affairs and stationed at Zhengyang. In 1274 (the eleventh year of Zhiyuan), he was promoted to Senior General of the Valiant Cavalry Guard and Left Vice Director of the Secretariat and decisively defeated the navy of the Song commander Xia Gui at Darenzhou.

In January 1275 (the twelfth year of Zhiyuan), Liu Zheng was ordered to campaign in Huainan, covering the central army's offensive from the eastern wing. Eager to cross the Yangtze and compete with the central force for credit, he was stopped by the chief commander Bayan and could not do so. When he later heard that Bayan had crossed the river and entered Ezhou, Liu Zheng lamented: “The chief commander stopped me, only to let others complete the achievement after me. One who devises well does not necessarily complete well. So it has proved.” That night, overcome with frustration, he died beneath the walls of Wuwei in Anhui at the age of sixty-three. He was posthumously awarded the offices of Senior General of the Dragon-and-Tiger Guard and Right Vice Director of the Secretariat, with the posthumous title Wumin.

Major Activities

Military Contributions

Liu Zheng accumulated numerous military achievements throughout his life. Early in his career, while accompanying Meng Gong in the attack on Jin-held Xinyang, he led twelve men in a night assault and captured the defending commander, earning the nickname “Sai Cunxiao.” After entering Sichuan he repeatedly distinguished himself in battle and was known as “Tie Husun.” After surrendering to the Yuan, he played a crucial role in the Battle of Xiangyang.

Liu Zheng influenced the Yuan in two principal ways: he proposed the strategy of first taking Xiangyang, and he organized a powerful Yuan navy.

Strategy of Taking Xiangyang First

At the time, the Yuan and Southern Song faced one another along a line running through the Huai region, the Xiang–Han region, and Sichuan. Eastern Huai was crisscrossed by waterways and unfavorable for Mongol cavalry. Western Huai relied on the Huai River, where the Southern Song had concentrated heavy forces. In Sichuan, Song defenders stubbornly held the mountain fortresses built by Yu Jie. By comparison, the Xiang–Han region was like the soft middle of a thousand-li-long snake. Xiangyang and Fancheng stood exposed on the front and were relatively vulnerable. If the Yuan took Xiangyang, Ezhou, the key stronghold on the middle Yangtze, would lose its shield. If Ezhou could not be held, the Southern Song's thousand-li defense line would be cut in the middle and severed into two sections.

Volume 6, “Xiangyang under Siege”, states: “Xiangyang is the backbone of the southeast; without Xiangyang, the state cannot stand. Lü Zhi once said that if Xiangyang is gained, one can communicate with Shu Han and hold Guanzhong in check; if Xiangyang is lost, the enterprise south of the Yangtze becomes a matter of concern. This is precisely the point.”

Building the Yuan Navy

Liu Zheng proposed developing naval forces. The History of Yuan, “Biography of Liu Zheng,” records: “In the third month of the seventh year [of Zhongtong], a solid platform was built in the middle current of the Han River, with crossbows and artillery above and five stone enclosures below to obstruct enemy ships. He also proposed: ‘Our elite infantry and swift cavalry break whoever stands before them; only in naval warfare are we inferior to the Song. If we take away their strength, build warships, and train a navy, then the undertaking will succeed.’ The proposal was sent by express courier, and approval was granted. After returning, he built five thousand ships and trained the navy every day. Even when rain made it impossible to go out, they drew ships on the ground and practiced.”

The Yuan navy played an important role in the major campaigns that ultimately destroyed the Southern Song. One of the three principal forces attacking Lin'an was a naval force. In the Battle of Yashan, Yuan forces used light craft such as “shui shaoma” and “Batu war boats” to maneuver freely and used artillery to defeat the Song army.

Tactical Conduct of the Xiangyang Campaign

Kublai Khan appointed Liu Zheng commander-in-chief and allowed him to deliberate on military affairs with the chief commanders, enabling him to put his military ideas into practice during the Xiangyang campaign. He adopted a strategy of starving Xiangyang through encirclement:

1. Sever contact with the Handong region — forts were built at Baihekou and Lumen Mountain east of Xiangyang.
2. Cut Xiangyang's supply route and prevent north–south communication — Shi Tianze built a long encircling wall beginning at Wanshan and incorporating Baizhang Mountain.
3. Establish a prolonged siege — one-line fortifications were built at Xianshan and Hutoushan, linking the forts and cutting the routes used by Xiangyang and Fancheng for gathering fuel and fodder.
4. Complete the encirclement of the two cities — new fortifications were added west of the Han River.
5. Sever westward communication on the Han River — forts were built at Wanshan to block westward river traffic, while palisades were erected at Guanzitan to cut the eastward route.

After repelling two Southern Song relief attempts, the Yuan army received a new weapon in the winter of 1271 (the eighth year of Zhiyuan): the Huihui trebuchet, a giant counterweight stone-throwing engine. In January 1272 (the ninth year of Zhiyuan), Fancheng fell, and Lü Wenhuan, isolated in Xiangyang, surrendered to the Yuan after defeat. After Xiangyang and Fancheng fell, the Southern Song gateway lay open and the strategic situation deteriorated rapidly.

His posts and campaigns after submitting to the Mongols can be set out by year: in 1262 he had audience with Kublai and was given a branch secretariat over Chengdu and Tongchuan circuits with the title of grand marshal; in 1263 he defeated the Song generals Gao Da and Wen He, relieved Chengdu and beat the Song again at the Jin River; in 1266 he was transferred to the title of general of manifest martial valour and pacification commissioner of Nanjing circuit; in 1267 he had audience and proposed that "to destroy the Southern Song, Xiangyang must be taken first"; in 1268 he was made general of the state-guarding guards and grand marshal, directing the siege of Xiangyang with Aju; in 1269 he captured the Song commander Tang Yongjian; in 1270 he built five thousand ships and trained seventy thousand sailors; in 1271 he intercepted the Song convoy carrying clothing and armour to Xiangyang and killed the Song general Zhang Shun; in 1272 he was given command of all the Han armies and was hit by a crossbow bolt sprung by Lü Wenhuan while attacking the outer wall of Fancheng; in 1273 Fancheng fell and Lü Wenhuan surrendered Xiangyang; in 1274 he was promoted to general of the mounted guards and left vice director of a branch secretariat, and destroyed the Song admiral Xia Gui's fleet at Darenzhou; in 1275 he died of grief and anger at not having taken part in the crossing of the Yangtze.

His proposal to take Xiangyang first and his creation of a navy worked together: once Xiangyang fell, the middle Yangtze lay open, and the navy allowed the Mongol side to contend with the Song on river and lake, the two together forming the key elements in the Yuan military plan to destroy the Song.

Personal Relations

• Son: Liu Yuan, followed Liu Zheng in defeating Zan Wanshou at Tongquan
• Son: Liu Yan, commander of a ten-thousand-household unit
• Son: Liu Jun, Tea Monopoly Commissioner
• Son: Liu Gai, courtesy name Zhongkuan, rose to Senior General Who Upholds the State, Assistant Grand Councilor of the Sichuan Branch Secretariat, and Pacification Commissioner and commander-in-chief for Bafan, Shunyuan, and other areas
• Grandson: Liu Keren, Prefect of Fangzhou
• Meng Gong: renowned Southern Song commander under whom Liu Zheng served early in his career; called him “Sai Cunxiao”
• Zhao Fang: Southern Song statesman under whom Liu Zheng had served; before his death described Liu Zheng as “overflowing with talent; if your generation cannot make use of him...”
• Li Zengbo: Liu Zheng entered Sichuan with him in 1254 (the second year of Baoyou)
• Jiang Wanzai: a superior who valued Liu Zheng and later resigned
• Emperor Lizong of Song: Southern Song emperor who was furious after Liu Zheng defected to the Yuan
• Kublai Khan: Yuan emperor who accepted Liu Zheng's surrender and adopted his strategy
• Bayan: chief Yuan commander who, after the Battle of Xiangyang, prevented Liu Zheng from crossing the Yangtze to compete for military credit
• Aju: Yuan commander-in-chief who supervised the siege of Xiangyang together with Liu Zheng
• Lü Wende: Southern Song commander who suspected and persecuted Liu Zheng, helping drive him to defect to the Yuan
• Yu Xing: Sichuan military administrator who joined Lü Wende in persecuting Liu Zheng
• Jia Sidao: powerful Southern Song chancellor who drove Xiang Shibi and Cao Shixiong to death, leaving Liu Zheng feeling “increasingly endangered and unable to preserve himself”
• Xia Gui, Gao Da, Wang Jian: veteran Song commanders who resented Liu Zheng
• Xu Biaosun: refused to draft Liu Zheng's surrender proclamation and was killed together with his family

Historical Assessment

Southern Song / Contemporary

• Zhao Fang: “Liu Zheng is overflowing with talent. If your generation cannot make use of him, you should kill him and not leave him to become a future danger.” (History of Song)
• Meng Gong: called him “Sai Cunxiao,” comparing him to the Five Dynasties commander Li Cunxiao
• Emperor Lizong of Song: upon hearing that Liu Zheng had defected to the Yuan, exclaimed, “The upheaval south of Luzhou must be dealt with urgently.” (Political Essentials of the Three Courts at the End of the Song)

Yuan Period

• Kublai Khan: “My decision is made!” when adopting Liu Zheng's strategy of taking Xiangyang first (History of Yuan, “Biography of Liu Zheng”)
• The History of Yuan, “Biography of Liu Zheng,” records his military contributions in detail and affirms his role in building the navy

Ming and Qing Periods

• Qiantang Yishi assessed Xiangyang's strategic position: “Xiangyang is the backbone of the southeast; without Xiangyang, the state cannot stand.”
• Ming and Qing historians generally regarded Liu Zheng as a key promoter of the fall of the Southern Song, while assessments of his defection to the Yuan varied

Modern Period

• Modern historians have argued that Liu Zheng influenced the Yuan in two major ways: proposing the strategy of first taking Xiangyang and organizing a powerful Yuan navy
• Some scholars have argued that Liu Zheng's defection resulted from intensified internal conflict within the Southern Song and that Lü Wende's role in driving him to defect caused incalculable losses to the dynasty
• Liu Zheng's strategy of starving Xiangyang through encirclement has been regarded by later military historians as a classic example of siege warfare