Cui Hao

Biography

Early service

Cui Hao came from the prominent Qinghe Cui clan and was the son of Cui Hong, another major Northern Wei minister. He mastered the classics, historical texts, astronomy, and calligraphy. Under Emperor Daowu he worked on secretariat documents and court writings. Under Emperor Mingyuan he lectured on the classics and was consulted on omens and state policy.

Political and military advice

When drought and famine struck Pingcheng in 415, many officials proposed moving the capital. Cui argued that abandonment of the northern base would expose the state to enemies and suggested sending the poorest households to food-producing provinces. The harvest recovered in 416. During Liu Yu's northern expedition, Cui advised the court to let Liu proceed into Guanzhong and wait for his inevitable withdrawal. He later supported timely campaigns against the Xia, Northern Liang, and the Rouran.

The National History Inquisition

Cui supervised the compilation of Northern Wei history. His direct treatment of the ruling house and the public display of historical inscriptions offended powerful aristocratic groups. In 450 the court opened the National History Inquisition, and Cui and his relatives were executed. The case ended the career of one of Northern Wei's most influential advisers.

His Family and Early Years

Cui Hao, courtesy name Boyuan, was a man of Qinghe and the eldest son of Cui Xuanbo, duke of Baima. From youth he loved letters and read widely in the classics and histories, and of the mysteries of the heavens and the yin-yang and the sayings of the hundred schools there was nothing he did not master, refining the meaning of the classics so that none of his time could match him; before he came of age he was a gentleman of the court. In the Tianxing period he was given charge of the secretariat and made a compiler, and Emperor Daowu, because he was skilled in calligraphy, kept him always about him. In the emperor's last years he took the cold-food powder and was violent and capricious, and the officers of the palace and court were mostly punished for trifling faults, so that all fled and hid to escape the peril of the moment; and Cui Hao alone was reverent and diligent and never slack, sometimes not going home all day. The emperor, learning of it, had gruel sent him. At that time Cui Xuanbo neither offended Tabgatch Gui nor flattered him, so that of all men only father and son Cui Hong and Cui Hao were never reproved.

The Reign of Emperor Mingyuan and His Study of Heaven and Man

Early in the reign of Taizong Cui Hao was made libationer of the erudites and given the rank of viscount of Wucheng, and he often lectured the emperor on the classics; and at every suburban sacrifice father and son rode in light carriages together, which men of the time thought a glory. Taizong loved the arts of yin-yang and numbers, and hearing Cui Hao expound the Changes and the Five Phases of the Great Plan was pleased with him, and had him divine fortunes and consult the heavens and settle doubts; and Cui Hao, joining the way of Heaven to the affairs of men and examining them together and setting out their main lines, used them to divine all prodigies and changes, and was mostly fulfilled. He was constantly in the great counsels of army and state and was much favoured and trusted. At that time hares appeared in the inner palace, and the gatekeepers being questioned, the hares could not have entered at all; and Emperor Mingyuan thought it strange and had Cui Hao judge whether it was an evil omen, and Cui Hao held that a neighbouring state would send tribute of palace women, which was a good omen; and the next year Yao Xing indeed sent daughters.

His Remonstrance against Moving the Capital

In the second year of Shenrui the autumn grain failed, and the grand astrologer Wang Liang and Su Yuan, through the princess of Huayin and others, cited the prophecy books to say that the state should rule from Ye with great joy for fifty years, and urged Taizong to move the capital. Cui Hao with the special advance Zhou Dan told Taizong that to move the capital to Ye might save that year's famine but was no long-term policy; that the men of the eastern provinces had always held that the state dwelt in the vast desert with untold people and livestock, called a multitude like cow's hair; that if the old troops were left and families moved south they would scarce fill the provinces, and dwelling mixed in the commanderies among the thickets, unused to the soil and water, dying of plague, their true state would show and the people's spirit would flag; that the four quarters hearing of it would think lightly of the state, and Qugai and the Rouran would come up together, so that Yunzhong and Pingcheng would be in danger, and separated by the thousand-li barrier of Heng and Dai, rescue would be hard; so that both name and substance would suffer. He said that remaining in the north, if Shandong changed, light horse could come south and display majesty in the home country, and none knowing how many they were, the people would be awed at the dust of their coming, which was the state's long policy for overawing the Xia. Taizong thought it very right and said that these two men alone agreed with his own mind. And sending a palace favourite to ask them again what was to be done if they could not eat until the next autumn or if the next autumn also failed, Cui Hao and the other answered that the poorest households might be sent to the provinces to seek grain, and that if the next autumn were again barren they would think again, but that the capital must not be moved. Taizong followed them and distributed the people among the three provinces of Shandong for food and issued grain from the granaries, and the next year there was a great harvest.

The Debate on Lending the River Road to Liu Yu

In the first year of Taichang Liu Yu, a general of Sima Dezong, attacked Yao Hong, his fleet going from the Huai and the Si into the Qing and wishing to go up the Yellow River, and he asked leave to pass through the state. The decree put it to the ministers to discuss, and the outer court all said that the Hangu pass was called a natural barrier where one man with a spear could hold off ten thousand, and that Liu Yu with boats and infantry could not go west, and that if they took him in the rear his retreat would be hard, and that they should send troops first to cut the upper reaches of the river and not let him pass west; and the inner court agreed with the outer, and Taizong was about to follow them. Cui Hao alone said that this was not the best policy, for if they blocked his western road Liu Yu would surely land and come north, so that Yao would be untroubled and they themselves attacked; that the Rouran were raiding within and the people had little food, so that they could not send troops, for sending them south would bring the northern enemy on them and sending them to relieve the north would put the eastern provinces in danger; that it was better to lend him the river road, let Liu Yu go west, and then raise troops to block his eastern return, which was the trick of Bian Zhuang stabbing the tiger and getting both; for if Liu Yu won he would be grateful for the loan of the road, and if the Yao won they would not lose the name of helping a neighbour; and that even if Liu Yu took the passes, they were far and hard to hold, and he could not hold them, so that in the end they would be theirs. He said that without moving troops or horses they could sit and watch the outcome, shutting in two tigers and reaping a long profit, which was the best policy. The councillors still argued that if Liu Yu entered the pass he would have no road of advance or retreat and be attacked front and rear, and that if he landed he would come north; and Taizong followed the many and sent Zhangsun Song with troops against him, and they were beaten at Pancheng by Liu Yu's general Zhu Chaoshe with heavy losses, and Taizong, hearing of it, regretted not using Cui Hao's plan.

His Judgement of Liu Yu and the Portent of the Comet

In the second year Wang Yi, the grand administrator of Qijun under Sima Dezong, came over and memorialised a plan, saying that Liu Yu was at Luoyang and advising the state to cut his rear with troops so that his army could be taken without a battle; and the memorial being presented, Taizong thought it good. And when Cui Hao came forward to expound the books, Taizong asked him how Liu Yu's western campaign stood and whether in his judgement it would succeed; and Cui Hao answered that Yao Xing had loved empty fame without real use, and his son Hong was ill and his men and kin were parted from him, and that Liu Yu taking the chance of his peril, with keen troops and brave generals, would surely conquer him. Taizong asked how Liu Yu's martial ability compared with Murong Chui, and Cui Hao said Liu Yu was the stronger; and being asked to explain, he said that Murong Chui, inheriting the estate of a father and grandfather who had been lords, was noble from birth, and his kind turned to him as moths to fire, so that with a little support he could win merit; but Liu Yu rose up out of humble poverty, with no foot of land to stand on and not one soldier to use, and shouting aloud he destroyed Huan Xuan, took Murong Chao in the north and broke Lu Xun in the south, and so the usurped Jin declined and he held the state's command; and that if Liu Yu, having pacified Yao, returned, he would surely usurp his own lord, for such was the tendency of things. And the land of Qin, mixed of Rong and Yi, a country of tigers and wolves, he could not hold; and customs being different and men's hearts hard to change, to spread the teaching of Jing and Yang over the three Qin would be like flying without wings or walking without feet. And if he left a host to hold it, that would only help the enemy. And they should polish their arms and put off their armour, rest the people and guard the frontier, awaiting his return, for the land of Qin would in the end be theirs and could be held at ease. Taizong laughed and said that his reckoning was thorough. In the third year a comet came out of the Tianjin, entered the Taiwei, passed through the Beidou, wound through the Ziwei and trespassed on the Tianbang, and after more than eighty days reached the Han and vanished; and Taizong again summoned the scholars and diviners and asked in what state the portent of calamity would fall, since the realm was not yet one and the four quarters stood opposed, and he feared it greatly and bade them speak fully and hide nothing. All put Cui Hao forward to answer, and he said that the ancients had it that prodigies arise from men, and that where men gave no occasion portents did not act of themselves; that when men failed below, the change appeared above, and the constant signs of Heaven's affairs did not alter through a hundred ages; that the Han History recorded that before Wang Mang usurped the throne comets came and went just as now; that in the state the lord was honoured and the ministers low and there was order above and below with no strange hopes among the people; and that only the usurped Jin, base and diminished, had weak lords and strong ministers and had been oppressed for generations, so that Huan Xuan had seized and Liu Yu held power; and that comets, born of evil vapour, were the sign that the usurped Jin would perish and Liu Yu usurp. None could better his words, and Taizong firmly believed them. In the fifth year Liu Yu indeed deposed his lord Sima Dewen and made himself emperor, and Taizong summoned Cui Hao by post and told him that the sign of the comet he had spoken of had come true and that only today did he believe in the way of Heaven.

His Proposal to Set up the Heir, and His Filial Piety and Mourning

Taizong was always troubled by slight illness and portents appeared again and again, and he sent a palace favourite to ask Cui Hao secretly what was to be done, since he had been ill for years without cure and feared that if he suddenly died his sons were all young. Cui Hao said that the eastern palace should be established early, with loyal and worthy ministers whom the emperor trusted for tutors and trusted attendants about him as friends, so that he might within direct all business and without command the armies, acting as regent and comforting the troops with the six handles in his hand; that thus the emperor might take his ease, nourish his spirit and lengthen his years and take his medicines; and that after ten thousand years the state would have a grown lord and the people a place to turn, so that the wicked would lose hope and none would covet; and that this was the eternal statute and the great defence against calamity. And he said that the eldest son Tao, now nearly grown, bright, wise, mild and gentle, was the hope of all hearts, and that to set up the eldest son was the great rule of the rites. Taizong accepted it, and had Cui Hao announce it by decree at the ancestral temple and made the Shizu deputy lord of the state to hold court in the main hall; and the minister over the masses Zhangsun Song, the duke of Shanyang Xi Jin and the duke of Beixin An Tong were the left assistants seated in the eastern chamber facing west, while Cui Hao with the grand commandant Mu Guan and the cavalier attendant in ordinary Qiu Dui were the right assistants seated in the western chamber facing east, and the hundred officials attended to them. Taizong withdrew to the western palace and watched them in secret and heard his decisions, and was much pleased, saying to his attendants that Zhangsun Song was an old minister of long virtue who had served four reigns and preserved the altars of state, that Xi Jin was ready of speech and full of devices and famed far and near, that An Tong understood the feelings of the common sort and was practised in affairs, that Mu Guan understood the essentials of government and knew his mind, and that Cui Hao was widely read and strong of memory and versed in the meeting of Heaven and man; and that with these six to assist him he and they might range the four frontiers, punishing rebels and soothing the obedient, and have their will in the realm. When the ministers sometimes submitted doubts, Taizong said that this was not for him to know, and that it should be decided by their lord of the state. Earlier, when Cui Hong lay gravely ill, Cui Hao cut his nails and his hair and by night prayed facing the North Star in the courtyard for his father's life, begging to take his place, knocking his head till it bled, and for more than a year without ceasing, and scarce any of the household knew of it; and when his father died he mourned with all propriety, and men of the time praised him. Cui Hao inherited the rank of duke of Baima; and the court's ceremonies, its gracious decrees and edicts and the records of army and state were all in his charge. Cui Hao could make miscellaneous discourse but was not good at composition, and set his mind rather on institutions, statutes and the language of the classics; he made rules for the family sacrifices, set in order the five branches, and fixed the rites of the seasonal offerings and the measures of plenty and scant, whose meaning was clear and worth seeing. He disliked by nature the books of Laozi and Zhuangzi, and never read more than a few dozen lines before throwing them down, saying that such false and pretentious talk was not near to human feeling and could not have been written by Laozi; that Lao Dan practised the rites and was the teacher of Confucius, and how could he have made a book that ruined the law and disordered the teaching of the former kings.

Major Activities

Northern unification

Cui's strategic advice helped Emperor Taiwu exploit civil wars and fragmented defenses among the Xia and Northern Liang, while also managing the northern Rouran frontier.

Institutions and court writing

He worked on ritual, memorial, military documents, and legal discussion, helping a conquering regime develop a more regular administrative order.

Astronomy and learning

His interpretations of celestial phenomena belonged to the political culture of the period and show how cosmology and statecraft were connected in Northern Wei decision making.

His Military Counsels

The substance of Cui Hao's military thought was to examine the situation of a war in three respects at once, the affairs of men, the advantages of ground and the hour of Heaven, to weigh success and failure and foresee the tendency of things and so make the right military decision, holding that of the three the affairs of men came first and opposing superstitious talk. In strategy he held that the north should be dealt with before the south, that is, that the splinter states and hostile forces of the north should first be pacified and the enemy in the south dealt with afterwards, each destroyed in turn, and he opposed making enemies of two sides at once. In tactics he stressed the use of cavalry, striking the enemy's weakness with one's own strength, breaking up the enemy's alliances, attacking where he was weak, fixing the plan by the situation, deciding swiftly, and striking the snake at the head first. At the beginning of the reign of the Taiwu emperor the officers about him, envying Cui Hao's uprightness, joined to push him out and slander him, and though the emperor knew his ability he could not but accept the general voice, and so dismissed Cui Hao to live at home as a duke and summoned him for counsel when difficulties arose. When the emperor proposed to attack Helian Chang the ministers all thought it a hard matter and only Cui Hao said that for years past the planet Mars had again held the Yulin and formed the shape of the hook, which foretold the destruction of Qin, and that this year the five planets had all risen in the east, which was a sign favourable to a western campaign, Heaven and man agreeing and the hour being come, so that the chance must not be lost; and the emperor sent Xi Jin against the Puban region and himself with light horse surprised the Xia capital and returned with a great victory. Afterwards when the emperor again went against Helian Chang and came under the walls of Tongwan he gathered his troops and pretended to withdraw, and Helian Chang came on with shouting, extending his array in two wings, when wind and rain came from the southeast with a dust storm darkening heaven and earth; and the eunuch Zhao Ni advised that the wind and rain were behind the enemy and against them, and that Heaven did not help them and the officers were famished, and that the emperor should lead the troops to avoid them and plan a great stroke another day. Cui Hao rebuked him, asking what sort of talk this was, and whether, having come a thousand li to win, they could change in a single day; and said that the enemy's advance could not be stopped and their rear was far cut off, so that they should divide and strike by surprise, and that the way to deal with wind lay in men's planning. So the emperor disposed his troops again and attacked with all his force, and the Xia army broke utterly. When the Rouran were discussed all the ministers opposed the campaign and Cui Hao alone strongly approved it, saying that Song had not recovered from the death of Liu Yu and was no direct threat, and that for the great work of uniting the north they must first deal with the strong states of the north, Xia and the Rouran. Zhang Yuan and Xu Bian argued from the heavens, and Cui Hao answered that yang was grace and yin was punishment, and that at a solar eclipse the lord should accumulate virtue and at a lunar eclipse attend to punishments; that an emperor's use of the law was to bind criminals and execute them in the market, and that for a guilty enemy state he should use armour to destroy them, so that to send troops now against a guilty state was precisely to strengthen punishment. He added that if Zhang Yuan and Xu Bian spoke of the heavens that was their own business, but that of the affairs of men and the present situation they could hardly judge with certainty; and he asked them whether before Tongwan was taken there had been any sign of its collapse, and they, having said nothing beforehand, were ashamed and could not answer. The emperor was much pleased and said that he had decided, and that it was indeed true that the ministers of a fallen state could not be consulted. Cui Hao went on that in summer the Rouran by custom scattered to pasture and in autumn when their beasts were fat gathered together, and raided south in the cold, and that to strike them unawares in force would surely succeed, only the generals might not go deep enough for a complete victory. The emperor at last put away his doubts and resolved on the great campaign, which by Cui Hao's plan of taking them unawares and striking where they were unprepared won a decisive victory, the Rouran main force breaking and suing for marriage, and from then they were no longer the chief threat to Wei. When Northern Liang was discussed Li Shun opposed it most strongly: he had gone as the emperor's envoy to Northern Liang twelve times and knew its condition thoroughly, and had foretold that the Juqu would soon fall, but being greedy of wealth he had gradually been bought by the men of Liang with heavy bribes, and now he invented the lie that from west of the Wenyu river to Guzang the ground was all dry stones and there was no water or grass at all. Cui Hao said that the Han History's chapter on geography recorded that Liangzhou's livestock was the richest in the realm, and asked how, if there were no water or grass, the herds could breed; and that the Han would never have built cities and set up commanderies in a land without water or grass; and that moreover the melting snow of the high mountains could but moisten the surface and settle the dust, and how could it be led into channels to irrigate the fields; and that such talk was absurd and unbelievable. Li Shun, angry and ashamed, said that seeing for oneself was better than hearing, and that he had seen it with his own eyes and what right had Cui Hao to dispute with him; and Cui Hao struck home, saying that he had taken bribes of money and wanted to speak for those men, and asked whether he thought he could not see through him without having seen with his own eyes. Cui Hao offered many strange plans and won many merits in the destruction of Xia, the destruction of Northern Liang, the campaign against the Rouran and the southern war against Liu Song. The emperor once told Cui Hao that he was deeply learned and had served his grandfather and his father, loyal through three reigns, and that he therefore valued him especially, and asked him to speak out whatever he thought and help him govern, for though his own temper might sometimes be bad and he might not take his advice, yet on quiet reflection he always found that Cui Hao was right. And pointing to Cui Hao before the chiefs newly submitted, he said that they should not think this man frail and without strength to bind a chicken, for what he carried in his breast was far better than armour and soldiers, and that when he himself wavered before a campaign it was Cui Hao who made him resolve, and always with a great victory, and that this was his merit. The emperor was not only trusting but close to him: he sometimes went to Cui Hao's house to consult him, and Cui Hao, having no time to prepare fine food, would set out the ordinary dishes, and the emperor would always gladly take them up and eat; and when Cui Hao came into the palace to see him, the place was not confined to the court hall, for he might come and go in the bedchamber.

His Position as a Great Clansman and His Selection of Men

Cui Hao wished to set the human relationships in order and to distinguish the surnames and clans, and Lu Xuan advised him to think thrice; but Cui Hao, though he said nothing against it, in the end would not take the advice. The Wei History's life of Cui Hao says that he set his mind on institutions and statutes and the language of the classics, made family rules of sacrifice, ordered the five branches, and fixed the rites of the seasonal offerings and the measures of plenty and scant with a meaning worth seeing, and disliked the books of Laozi and Zhuangzi, this being the tradition of the great Confucian clans since the Eastern Han; and it adds that he traced matters up to the great beginning and down through the abuses of Qin and Han, his main aim being to restore the five ranks of nobility. In choosing scholars Cui Hao advanced both family and moral standing, and in his mind the clan that combined high office with Confucian learning was the ideal first rank of gentry; and through the selection of scholars his final aim was to revive the Confucian five ranks. By the Northern History's life of Li Xin, when teaching assistants were chosen Cui Hao put forward his disciple Xiangzi with Lu Dushi and Li Fu, and he did not choose Li Xin because he came of the Li of Fanyang and was not of a great clan, whereas Li Fu came of the Li of Zhaojun and Lu Dushi of the Lu of Fanyang, both of great clans. Besides this, when the emperor wished to appoint Cui Hao's nominees directly as grand administrators, Tuoba Huang told Cui Hao that the men recruited earlier had also been chosen as provincial and commandery officers and had held those posts a long while, toiling without reward from the court, and that they should first be filled into the posts of grand administrator and magistrate while the newly recruited took their places as gentlemen, and that moreover the grand administrators and magistrates who governed the people should be men who had seen the world and had experience; but Cui Hao held to his own view and in the end sent out the men he had recommended.

Personal Relations

• Father: Cui Hong, Northern Wei minister.
• Rulers served: Tuoba Gui, Tuoba Si, and Tuoba Tao.
• Colleagues: Changsun Song, Xi Jin, Mu Guan, Qiu Dui, and Kou Qianzhi.
• Political opponents: aristocratic groups threatened by his historical writing and direct counsel.

Representative Works

• The works of Cui Hao still recorded in the sources include the Enfeoffment of the Prince of Juqu, the Memorial on the Five Elements, the Memorial Submitting the Praise of the Emperors, the Prefaces to the Prognostication and to the Odes, the Discourse on Zhuge Wuhou, the Northern Song of the Guangde Hall and the Female Admonitions; they are to be seen in the Collected Works of the Latter Wei and in the relevant records. Most of his writings were practical documents or records of the classics, and complete texts survive only in small part.

Historical Assessment

Traditional histories praise Cui as learned, perceptive, and strategically gifted, while the National History Inquisition became a warning about the limits placed on historical writing by dynastic politics. Modern scholarship sees him as a key Han Chinese adviser in Northern Wei state formation, but also treats his omen interpretation as part of the period's political cosmology rather than modern prediction.